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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2490 
___________ 
 
DANIEL L. SPUCK, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CLEARFIELD COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:13-cv-00046) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Possible 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 29, 2013 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  September 4, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Daniel Spuck, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals pro se the dismissal of his 
complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.  See LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 
10.6.     
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Spuck filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various civil rights 
infractions against past and present Clearfield County officials.  Spuck’s claims all relate 
to conduct during his 1996 criminal trial.  Acting prior to service, the Magistrate Judge 
issued a report and recommendation that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.  The Magistrate 
Judge’s report identified five claims,1
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
 all but one of which were barred by Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  The final claim was against Judge Fredric Ammerman, 
who presided over Spuck’s criminal trial in Clearfield County, for failure to discover 
Spuck’s alleged medical condition.  The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of this 
claim based on the defendant’s absolute immunity or, in the alternative, because the 
statute of limitations would have run long ago.  Spuck filed objections and the District 
Court, after de novo review, dismissed Spuck’s complaint for failure to state a claim, and 
denied leave to amend as futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 106 
(3d Cir. 2002).        
dismissal for failure to state a claim.  See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  Dismissal is appropriate where the pleader has not alleged 
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”  
                                              
1 Depending on how separately we view Spuck’s allegations that prosecutors withheld 
favorable evidence, destroyed evidence, and planted false evidence, we might count more 
than five; but, as we explain below, we agree with the Magistrate Judge that these claims 
are all barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).   
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  The standard requires a two-part analysis. 
First, we separate the complaint’s factual allegations from its legal conclusions; having 
done that, we take only the factual allegations as true, deciding whether the plaintiff has 
alleged a plausible claim for relief.  See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-
11 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion.  Great W. 
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010).  We 
may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 
(3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 Here, the District Court’s conclusion that Heck v. Humphrey barred almost all of 
Spuck’s claims was correct.  The allegations include planting false evidence, failure to 
swear in the jury,2 destroying or refusing to turn over exculpatory evidence, prosecutorial 
misconduct, and a claim alleging that the defendants prevented discovery of the fact that 
Spuck was incompetent to stand trial.  See, e.g., Long v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 670 
F.3d 436, 447 (3d Cir. 2012) (Heck barred claims of conspiracy to secure an erroneous 
conviction by use of perjury).  These claims would all “necessarily imply the invalidity of 
his conviction” – which Spuck is still litigating.3
                                              
2 Spuck’s complaint describes his entire criminal trial as defamatory because the jury was 
not sworn.  After careful review of his complaint, we understand this to be a challenge to 
the jury’s authority to convict him rather than the tort of defamation.  
  Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.  Accordingly, 
3 Spuck’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendations admit that the 
conviction is still extant and his notice of appeal acknowledges that his post-conviction 
challenges remain pending.  Spuck argues that a pending reconsideration by the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court means the claims are not barred by Heck.  Like the District 
Court, we find this argument meritless.  We note that Spuck has filed numerous 
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Spuck is barred from bringing them unless and until he gets a favorable termination of 
the related state criminal conviction and proceedings.  Id.   
The remaining issue (“remaining” in that the Heck bar would not apply) is 
Spuck’s allegation that the failure to further investigate Spuck’s medical condition was a 
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation of his right to appropriate medical care.  
See Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 471 (3d Cir. 1987) (state pretrial detainees are 
entitled to appropriate medical care by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  It is not entirely clear who this allegation is against, but Spuck appears to 
make this allegation against Judge Ammerman,4
Taking as true Spuck’s allegation that failure to order additional medical 
evaluation prevented discovery of Spuck’s aphasia, this is still insufficient to plausibly 
establish Spuck’s entitlement to relief, because it is does not approach an allegation of 
“acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs.”  Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).  All Spuck has 
 a deputy sheriff, and a “John/Jane Doe” 
court administrator.  
                                                                                                                                                  
unsuccessful habeas petitions, including some of the same claims we find barred by Heck 
here.  See In re: Daniel Luke Spuck, No. 10-2756 (3d Cir. Aug. 10, 2010) 
(nonprecedential).    
 
4 This is not the first time Spuck has attempted to sue Judge Ammerman, though the 
previous case was incorrectly captioned (inverting Judge Ammerman’s first and last 
names).  See Spuck v. Frederic, No. 10-4288, 415 F. App’x 358 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(nonprecedential).  As noted by the Magistrate Judge, Judge Ammerman has absolute 
immunity from suits for damages when they arise out of his official duties.  See, e.g. 
Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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alleged is that someone could have ordered that Spuck be seen by a neurologist.  Spuck 
has not alleged that any of the defendants knew of his alleged medical condition, nor that 
it would be apparent to a lay person (nor can he, as it was not diagnosed until 15 years 
after the events at issue).  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (analyzing 
required knowledge to show “deliberate indifference”); see also Woloszyn v. County of 
Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing required mental state to establish 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation and comparing to the Farmer standard).  
Spuck’s complaint demonstrates this insufficiency by repeatedly characterizing the 
failure to secure additional medical treatment in 1996 as “negligent.”  See Estelle, 429 
U.S. at 106 (negligence insufficient in the Eighth Amendment context).  For the same 
reasons, we believe it was not an abuse of discretion to deny Spuck leave to amend as 
futile.  See Connelly v. Steel Valley School Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 217 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(affirming denial of leave to amend as futile). 
  For the reasons given, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.   
                                                                                                                                                  
 
